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Abstract: Studies focusing on argumentation in less formal contexts (e.g. the family) show that if children are given 
room to pursue their lines of thought, they often produce sophisticated spontaneous argumentation. In this paper I 
consider arguments from definition introduced by children as a case in point of spontaneous argumentation. To do so, 
I analyze data, in which small children under the age of six years, discuss with adults and with peers. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the field of argumentation and education there seems to be disagreement on whether small 
children independent of their stage of development are able to discuss and give arguments for their 
standpoints (Danish & Enyedy 2015, Stein & Bernas 1999, Pontecorvo & Arcidiacono 2010, 
Völzing 1982) or whether the ability of resolving a dispute in a reasonable way, thus by using 
argumentative discourse is something that needs to be taught and only gradually develops from 
childhood to adulthood (Felton & Kuhn 2001, Kuhn 1991, Kuhn & Udell 2003, Golder 1996). 
Studies in less formal contexts were able to show that children can produce sophisticated 
argumentation, if they are given the necessary room to do so. For example, Arcidiacono and Bova 
(2013) as in their study of family conversations at the dinner table, have found positive cases of 
children’s argumentation. Danish and Enyedy (2015) show a case, where a group of kindergarten 
and primary school children in “an open solution space” (Danish & Enyedy 2015, p. 17) 
spontaneously start discussing on representations they have built in a science class, thereby 
benefiting from the fact that the setting allows for more than one final answer.  
In this paper, I have explicitly put the focus on a single case (Jackson 1986, Jacobs 1986). 
It is a critical case (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 74) as it shows how children may make use of argumentation 
from definition. Thus, in the present paper, I am departing from such a case, where small children 
(under the age of six years) spontaneously argue with peers or with an adult person. By doing so, 
I not only would like to show that even small children may be good arguers, but by making the 
children’s reasoning explicit, I would like to show the sophistication of the children’s reasoning 
underlying their argumentation. 
This paper has been developed within a research project funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation on children’s implicit argumentation.1 This project, which is carried out by 
the Institute of Psychology and Education of the University of Neuchâtel and the Institute of 
Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics of the Università della Svizzera Italiana in Lugano, aims 
at studying spontaneous argumentation processes, in which small children are involved. In order 
to be able to describe and understand the children’s arguments, the project focuses on what is left 
                                                          
1“Analyzing children’s implicit argumentation: Reconstruction of procedural and material premises”; project no. 
100019_156690; applicants: A.-N. Perret-Clermont, S. Greco, A. Iannaccone and A. Rocci. 
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implicit in the arguments of the children and the adults discussing with them. The project thereby 
wants to contribute to a resolution of the above described disagreement on whether small children 
are able to put forward a standpoint and support it with arguments. In order to do so, the project 
works with data from three different settings, among them the “revised-Piagetian” discussions that 
have been recorded in kindergarten and schools for research in psychology (Perret-Clermont 
1979).  
The case reported here is taken from such a “revised-Piagetian task,” that is to say, from a 
semi-structured setting, where children in a school setting spontaneously start discussions, while 
they are solving a task given to them by an adult. I will present two excerpts of a longer 
conversation, in which two children and an adult experimenter are involved. By choosing an 
example that occurred in a semi-structured setting, such as the “revised-Piagetian discussion” is, I 
not only want to show that small children are able to support their standpoints with arguments, but 
that they are able to do so in a context that does not a priori give them a lot of room for spontaneous 
discussion. This is so, since the adult experimenter has an agenda of issues to discuss with the 
children and hence does not explicitly leave room for spontaneous discussions. Nevertheless, the 
children are able to start their own lines of argument. Within this argumentative discussion, I am 
focusing in particular on the children’s use of the argument from definition. I could identify two 
different situations, in which the children make use of this locus: on the one hand, the children 
spontaneously set out the issue of the discussion and support their standpoint by arguments from 
definition. On the other hand, the issue of the discussion is given by an adult and the children make 
use of arguments from definition in order to contest or refute the arguments from the adult 
discussant.  
 
2. Theoretical framework  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze spontaneous argumentation produced by children in a pre-
structured setting. In order to do so, I will combine two theoretical approaches. I will make use of 
the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004) in 
order to reconstruct the argumentative discussion. My focus will lie on the confrontation stage, 
where the existence of a difference of opinion becomes evident, that is to say the point in the 
discussion, when a new issue (spontaneously) emerges. I will analyze the types of disputes the 
children engaged in, adopting the pragma-dialectical differentiation between single (one 
proposition is put to doubt) and multiple disputes (multiple propositions are discussed); and mixed 
(discussions on two standpoints) and non-mixed disputes (discussions on one standpoint) (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 17). By using the analytic overview (van Eemeren et al. 1992, 
pp. 93-95), I will be able to represent the standpoints and the arguments supporting them, thus 
including the premises that are made explicit by the discussants and leaving out non argumentative 
parts of the discussion. In order to analyze some moves of the argumentation stage of a critical 
discussion, that is, the part, where “arguments in support or against a standpoint are advanced and 
critically tested” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 60), I will make use of the Argumentum 
Model of Topics (henceforth: AMT) (Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2009). The AMT model is a tool 
for the analysis of the inferential mechanisms that lie at the basis of an argumentative move. It 
combines two syllogisms: a procedural and a material one. The model allows for insights into the 
implicit reasoning of an arguer on formal, as well as on cultural premises. By applying this model, 
we will be able to reconstruct the implicit reasoning of the children, and thereby better understand 
why a specific argument is given to support the analyzed standpoint. The model will furthermore 
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enable us to reveal possible misalignments that occur in the discussion caused by the different 
points of departure of children’s and adult’s reasoning. The procedural part, on the one hand, 
allows for the logical reconstruction of an argumentative move. A locus, that is the principle of 
support (Garssen 2001) between a standpoint and the argument, is connected to a minor premise 
through an inferential connection that is called maxim. The material part, on the other hand, is 
made of cultural concepts that are generally shared between the discussants. The reasoning in this 
component is represented by two premises: an endoxon that is a culturally shared concept and the 
datum, i.e. the facts that are present in the discussion. However, the analysis of argumentative 
moves show that it is often the endoxon that the children and adult do not share in the moment of 
the discussion. The analyses in section 4 will show one case, in which the endoxon is not shared 
between a child and an adult and another case, where the two children do not share the same datum, 
i.e. they interpret the facts of the situation differently (Greco Morasso & Morasso 2014).  
The conjoint use of the Pragma-dialectical Model of a critical discussion and the 
Argumentum Model of Topics has been applied before on other occasions, (see for instance Perret-
Clermont et al. 2015, Greco Morasso 2011) and explained in detail in Palmieri 2014. 
 
2.1. Definition in the literature 
 
The argumentative discussions I am focusing on here, make use of the locus from definition. This 
means that the reasoning of the analyzed argumentation moves, is based on a definition. The locus 
from definition has already been described by ancient and medieval rhetoricians such as Aristotle, 
Cicero, Boethius and Peter of Spain and in modern times has been treated among others by 
Hastings (1963), Macagno (2008) and Walton & Macagno (2009, 2010). In what follows, I will 
give a short overview on the development and the treatment of the locus of definition in the ancient 
traditions and briefly mention some of the more recent contributions to this topic. Please note, that 
this overview is only a snapshot of the work on the locus from definition and does not intend to be 
complete. 
Aristotle was the first scholar who worked on definition. Definition is one of the five 
predicables, that is, relations between a predicate and a subject. As such, for Aristotle, every 
definition consists of a genus and a differentia that specifies the genus. Thus, a definition should 
represent the essence of the defined object. The goal of a definition is to make the defined object 
more known to the addressees. Therefore, the terms and concepts used in the definition itself need 
to be intelligible to the addressees (Wagner & Rapp 2004, Tredennick & Forster 1960, Ross 1958). 
In the fourth book of his Topica, Aristotle classifies the things according to their species under a 
certain genus. Walton and Macagno define the genus-species relation as “stating the semantic 
features which distinguish an entity from the others within the same class” (Walton & Macagno 
2010, p. 41). However Aristotle’s classification englobes more than genus and species. The 
classification includes three levels: the genus, the species and the individual. The genus is the 
superordinate entity followed by the species and the individual: “For the individuals also partake 
of the genus and of the species;” (Tredennick & Forster 1960, p. 427). As an example of this three-
levelled hierarchy, Aristotle states that an individual person is part of both the species ‘human’ 
and the genus ‘animated being’ (Wagner & Rapp 2004, p. 119). Aristotle furthermore claims that 
what is said of the genus is automatically true for the species and the individuals. The reverse, 
however, is not true, since only the species and the individual can be part of a genus, a genus, 
however, cannot be part of a species or an individual. Thus he states that if a genus is stated in the 
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category of a thing, this statement comprehends all the characteristics of all the other (sub- or 
superordinate) levels as well:  
 
For, if one genus is predicated in the category of essence, all of them, both higher 
and lower than this one, if they are predicated of the species, will be predicated in 
the category of essence; so that the genus assigned is also predicated in the category 
of essence. The fact that, if one genus is predicated in the category of essence, all 
the rest, if they are predicated, will be predicated in the category of essence, must 
be obtained by induction. (Tredennick & Forster 1960, p. 431, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
The fifth book of Aristotle’s Topica is devoted to the property. Aristotle identifies the 
property (gr. ἴδιον, lat. proprium) as one of the five predicables. Although not directly connected 
to definition in an Aristotelian sense, property might be useful to identify a given thing within a 
set of things. A property is exclusive and designates a kernel of a thing, therefore going under the 
main label of ‘definition’. It consists of the name of the thing and the description of it. Aristotle 
presents different kinds of properties: relative properties, properties that inhere to entities as such 
and permanent properties that are inherent to a thing. In this article, I am mostly interested in the 
latter. Aristotle gives the following examples for permanent / temporary properties: a permanent 
property of God is that He is an immortal living being, whereas a temporary property of a man 
would be to walk in a gymnasium (Wagner & Rapp 2004, p. 145). In order to verify if something 
is a property, Aristotle proposes to observe the relation between the name and the description of 
the thing:  
 
In the constructive argument, the object is to see whether the description (given in 
the property) also is predicated of that of which the name (of the subject) is 
predicated and whether the name also is predicated of that of which the description 
is predicated. (Tredennick & Forster 1960, p. 509) 
 
The sixth book of the Topica is devoted to topoi that involve definitions, listing five 
principle requirements for a definition to be valid (Rigotti & Greco, in preparation). For reasons 
of space these cannot be treated in detail here.  
Boethius has not only translated Aristotle’s Topica to Latin, but with his work De topicis 
differentiis, he has contributed to the further development of Aristotle’s and Cicero’s work. So, he 
has also worked on inferential connections, being in straight connection with the Aristotelian 
predicables. He gives a list of inferential connections, specifying among others, the relation 
between the definition and the other predicables (genus, property and accident). Boethius 
combines the works of Aristotle and Cicero on this matter and further develops them. His 
classification of loci, unlike Aristotle’s is based on the topical differences. He proposes the classes 
of intrinsic, extrinsic and middle loci and, in accordance with Cicero, he classifies the locus from 
definition as an intrinsic locus (Boethii 1847, Stump 1978).  
Peter of Spain has coined the term of habitudo, describing an ontological relation between 
two poles, where the contrariness between the two poles can give origin to arguments. He interprets 
the loci as habitudes that generate inferences (Rigotti & Greco, in preparation). Peter of Spain 
names the loci according to that part of the habitudo from which the inference can be drawn and 
therefore distinguishes between two loci for every concept. In the case of the definition, he 
REBECCA G. SCHÄR 
5 
distinguishes between the “locus from definition” and “the locus from the defined”. He describes 
the locus from definition as the relation between the definition and the defined, whereas the locus 
from the defined would be the relation between the defined and the definition (Bochenski 1947). 
Together with the locus from description and the locus from interpretation, Peter of Spain classifies 
the loci from definition under the category of “loci from substance”. Within this class, he contrasts 
the pairs of loci among them. In order to illustrate the comparison between the types of loci from 
substance one can use the habitudo as a metaphor: The loci from definition can be situated on one 
pole of the category “loci from substance” whereas the loci from description can be situated on the 
opposing pole of this category. This is so, since the loci from definition take into account the 
essence of the thing described, whereas the loci from description work with “accidental traits” of 
the thing (Rigotti & Greco in preparation).  
In more modern times Hastings discusses in his typology of argument schemes 
(Hastings 1963), among others, the argument from definition to characteristics, a reasoning 
starting from the definition, as well as the argument from criteria to a verbal classification. The 
aim of the latter is to prove that a description or label is correctly attributed to an aspect of reality 
(Hastings 1963). In contemporary argumentation science, Macagno (e.g. 2008, 2010) and Walton 
& Macagno (2010) have worked on definition in argumentation, further developing certain 
concepts such as Hasting’s argument from criteria to verbal classification. In Pragma-Dialectics 
the locus from definition is not explicitly treated. However, it can be classified as symptomatic 
argumentation (van Eemeren et al. 2007, p. 154).  
As can be inferred from this short overview, scholars have identified many different sub-
classes of the locus from definition. For reasons of space, I have limited the discussion to the sub-
classes that have been identified in the analysis. The Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & 
Greco Morasso 2009, Rigotti & Greco 2010) applied in this paper, in order to explicit the implicit 
premises of the children’s arguments is partly based on the contributions of some of the above 
discussed authors. 
 
3. Corpus  
 
The data considered in this paper stems from a very large corpus that has been collected over the 
last 30 years at the Institute of Psychology and Education at the University of Neuchâtel in 
Switzerland.2 The corpus consists of situations, in which an adult experimenter (psychologist) aims 
at testing the developmental level on certain cognitive concepts, such as the conservation of 
quantities of liquids (i.e. whether the children realize that the amount of liquid remains unchanged 
even if it looks more in a long and thin container and less in a bowl like container). These kind of 
tasks, originally used to study the children’s conceptual reasoning (Piaget 1926/2003) have a long 
tradition in psychological research (Perret-Clermont 1979). The research group at the University 
of Neuchâtel has adapted the Piagetian task, in order to allow for peer-to-peer interactions since 
this “under certain circumstances can favor reasoning and argumentation, in particular when 
partners experience ‘socio-cognitive conflicts’ i.e. the confrontation hic et nunc of different 
conflicting points of view that they feel the need to overcome.” (Perret-Clermont et al. 2015, p. 
138, emphasis in the original). At the same time, the altered task is supposed to lead the focus 
away from the asymmetrical adult-child relation. The adult experimenter who is pursuing his goal 
                                                          
2 I would like to thank Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont and the Neuchâtel team for giving me access to the data. The data 
analyzed in this paper have been collected by Lysandra Sinclaire-Harding as part of the SNSF project No. 100019-
156690/1. 
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to assess the developmental level of a cognitive concept, asks the children to perform a certain task 
and comment on it. Thus, within this activity, the adult experimenter has in mind a precise agenda 
of issues to discuss with the children. Nevertheless, while performing the task and discussing their 
opinions with the adult experimenter and peers, it occurs that children spontaneously set up sub-
issues. These may be more or less directly related to the issues proposed by the adult.  
The discussion chosen for this paper, takes place in an angle of the children’s school. The 
data has been collected in an English school and both the children were five years old at the time 
of the data collection in October 2009. In order to participate in the task, they are separated from 
their fellows and brought to a table, where the tasks are set to take place. Thus the context of the 
interaction is very particular. There are many components that make the situation differ from 
‘usual’ school situation in the eyes of the children: The children are not familiar to the adult 
experimenter person, the less so they are aware or do understand the goal of the task. This leads to 
unexpected subjects of discussion from an adult experimenter’s perspective. That is to say, the 
context has an influence on the behavior and actions of the children (Perret-Clermont 2006, Rigotti 
& Rocci 2006) and at the same time, the actions and argumentation of the children may alter the 
context in the sense that they change the expected course of a discussion (Perret-Clermont 2001, 
p. 71). This might happen to a greater or lesser extent, depending on how much space the adult 
gives to the children’s spontaneous issues and arguments. The activity type (Levinson 1979, 
Rigotti & Rocci 2006, van Eemeren 2010) that I can detect in these situations is shaped by the 
perception of the participants. On the one hand, from the perspective of the adult experimenter, 
the activity type arises from a research-oriented goal, i.e. the observation of cognitive concepts in 
small children. Thus in the present situation, the activity type could be labelled as ‘discussion on 
the concept of conservation of the quantities of liquid.’ On the other hand, from the perspective of 
the children, I can imagine the activity type to be very vague. As described above, the children do 
not know about the goal of the adult experimenter. They may perceive it as a game, where they 
are guided by an adult person or as a kind of ‘test.’ In the present situation, the children behave in 
a way that gives rise to the impression that they do not know how to classify this activity. 
Whenever the adult experimenter takes another object, they start discussing on it, in order to 
explore the use of the object and the whole situation.  
 
4. Analysis  
 
4.1. Example 1: the giraffe 
 
In what follows, I will analyze two situations, in which the children make use of the locus from 
definition. In the first situation, the children spontaneously go over the issue proposed by the adult 
and initiate a sub discussion on an issue they proposed themselves. This discussion precedes the 
test of the conservation of liquids. The adult experimenter introduces the task to the children, with 
the help of a soft toy giraffe. The children are told a story that involves the giraffe and her soft toy 
friends. By doing so, the asymmetrical relation between the children and the adult experimenter is 
reduced. The children get room to freely express their standpoint and support it, by answering to 
the soft toy or to the adult experimenter (Greco Morasso et al. 2015).  
At the moment the analyzed extract takes place, the conversation between the two children 
Andrew3 (5:10 years) and Ben2 (5:7 years) and the adult experimenter has been going on for nine 
minutes. The adult experimenter is now introducing the soft toy giraffe to the children (see above). 
                                                          
3 The children’s names have been changed for reasons of privacy. 
REBECCA G. SCHÄR 
7 
Please note, that the children are seated on an edge of a hexagonal table, while the adult 
experimenter is seated in front of Andrew and to the right hand side of Ben. This is an important 
fact, since it means that the perspective the children have on all the objects used for the task differ. 
The transcription was based on a slightly modified version of Traverso (1999). A legend describing 
the used transcriptions signs can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Table 1. Excerpt 1: Participants: Andrew (5:7 years), Ben (5:10 years), adult experimenter 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 Exp. […] we put the monkey there and then this is 
2 Ben [a giraffe 
3 Andrew [a giraffe 
4 Exp. a giraffe yah 
5 Ben ((raising both hands)) it’s got a long neck 
6 Exp. yah alright 
7 Andrew that hasn’t actually a long neck it’s a little neck 
8 Exp. you’re right is not the longest neck [t t the longest neck  
9 Andrew          [((shakes his head)) 
10 Exp. for a giraffe [I’ve ever seen is it no  
11 Andrew         [((shakes his head)) 
12 Exp. you’re absolutely right ahm I think it could be a bit longer 
13 Andrew ((nods his head)) 
14 Exp. [but it’s still a giraffe  
15 Andrew [((nods his head)) 
16 Exp. just maybe it is a junior giraffe 
17 Andrew ((nods his head)) 
 
In turn 5 Ben, by giving an argument in favor of his standpoint “(this is) a giraffe” (turn 
2), spontaneously introduces the implicit issue “is this a giraffe?”. This issue is further pursued 
by Andrew, who in turn 7 shows his disagreement by giving a counterargument “that hasn’t 
actually a long neck it’s a little neck”. The adult experimenter in turns 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 reframes 
the discussion, when she tries to mediate between the two opposing standpoints of the children. 
On the one hand, she admits that she has seen giraffes with longer necks and on the other hand, 
she suggests that the soft toy giraffe may be a junior member of the species. Knowing about the 
design and the goal of the task, I am able to suggest that the aim of her move is to reconcile the 
children in order to proceed with the original task on the conservation of liquids. With the help of 
a slightly modified version of the analytic overview, this single mixed-dispute (van Eemeren 1992) 
can be represented as follows: 
 
 
Table 2. Analytic overview of excerpt 1 
Issue (introduced by the children): Is this a giraffe? 
    
Standpoint 1 Standpoint 2 
Ben 1 Yes Andrew 2 (No)4 
    
                                                          
4Whether this is an example of a mixed or a non-mixed dispute could be discussed. However, since the adult 
experimenter in turn 8 accepts Andrew’s standpoint, we consider it as a mixed- dispute.  
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Argument Argument 
Ben  
T. 5 
1.1 it’s got a long neck Andrew 
T. 7 
2.1 it hasn’t actually a long neck it’s a little 
neck 
 
The representation of the argument structure makes it evident that the discussion is taking 
place between the two children. Each of the children gives a single argument (Snoeck 
Henkemans 1997) to support its standpoint. Note that Andrew’s standpoint remains implicit in the 
discussion. The moves the adult experimenter makes in turns 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 are not part of 
the difference of opinion on the issue “Is this a giraffe?”. Even though one could suggest, 
considering each of the turns of the adult experimenter (see above) in an isolated way that she is 
giving an argument in favor of each of the two opposing standpoints. Such a consideration, 
however, would lead to the conclusion that the adult experimenter has no clear opinion on the 
issue, as the two arguments she puts forward are opposing each other. Therefore, I interpret the 
adult experimenter’s moves as having a mediating factor between the two opposing standpoints of 
the children.  
In order to understand the reasoning of the children I can analyze this difference of 
opinion by means of the so called y- structure of the AMT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this y- structure (Figure 1), I combined the argument of Ben and of Andrew in order to 
show what aspects they have in common and where they differ. Two of the components of the 
AMT y-structure can be directly linked to statements made in the discussion: The final conclusion 
Figure 1: AMT representation Argument 1.1 of Situation 1 
Andrew 
Datum 2 (Turn 7): This animal 
doesn’t have a long neck. 
First conclusion – Minor 
premise 2: This animal doesn’t 
have the defining trait of the 
species ‘giraffe’ 
Endoxon: A defining trait of the species 
‘giraffe’ is having a long neck 
Datum 1 (Turn 5): This animal has 
got a long neck 
First conclusion – Minor premise 1: This animal has the defining 
trait of the species ‘giraffe’ 
Final conclusion: This animal is a giraffe 
Maxim: If something has the 
defining trait of a given species, it 
belongs to that species 
Locus from definition 
(property) 
Final conclusion 2: This animal is not a 
giraffe 
Ben 
Andrew 
Ben 
Ben 
Andrew 
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given by Ben, corresponds to Ben’s standpoint in turn 2 of the transcript. The datum, is based on 
the facts present in the situation of the discussion and coincides with the argument Ben gives in 
turn 5 of the transcript in order to support this standpoint. The syllogism on the left hand side of 
the y-structure represents the material premises. The endoxon is a culturally shared premise that is 
substantiated by the facts (datum). The outcome of this reasoning is the first conclusion. On the 
right hand side of the y-structure, in the logical syllogism, one finds the locus – in this case a locus 
from definition – that designates the ontological relation between the argument and the standpoint. 
The maxim is the inferential connection between the locus and the final conclusion. By combining 
these two syllogisms, one is able to get insights into the reasoning process of the arguer. Ben 
pursues the reasoning that the soft toy animal shown by the adult experimenter is a giraffe. He 
therefore starts his reasoning from a maxim that takes the defining trait of a species into account. 
Arguably, according to what children in the western world are taught, when they get to know 
various animals, the defining trait of a giraffe is a long neck, thus the endoxon, of Ben’s reasoning 
is this culturally shared premise. Since in Ben’s eyes the soft toy animal introduced by the adult 
experimenter has in fact a long neck, he concludes that it is a giraffe. This reasoning is only 
partially shared by Andrew. In his reasoning, Andrew starts from the same maxim (“if something 
has the defining trait of a given species, it belongs to that species”) and acknowledges the same 
endoxon as Ben (“a defining trait of the species ‘giraffe’ is having a long neck”). To him, however, 
the soft toy animal introduced by the adult experimenter, does not possess this defining trait of a 
giraffe. He thus uses an opposite datum and therefore arrives to the final conclusion that the soft 
toy animal introduced by the adult experimenter is not a giraffe. Thanks to the reconstruction of 
the children’s reasoning by means of the y-structure, I can conclude that the difference of opinion 
(van Eemeren 1992), in this excerpt of the discussion stems from the different interpretation of the 
facts (data).  
The locus from definition introduced here by Ben can be more precisely identified as a 
property. In the present case the children use the property ‘long neck’ (description) in order to 
name the soft toy animal ‘giraffe’. The long neck is inherent to a giraffe, therefore it can be 
regarded as a permanent property of the species ‘giraffe’. In order to verify if this inference is 
correct, according to Aristotle, one can observe the relation between the name and the description 
of the thing, as I have explicated above. Thus, the description ‘animal with a long neck’ is 
predicated of the same living being as the name ‘giraffe’ and reversely, the name ‘giraffe’ is 
predicated of the same living being as the description ‘animal with a long neck’ is predicated. 
Since both directions of reading are correct, a long neck can be designated the property of a giraffe 
(Tredennick & Forster 1960, Rigotti & Greco in preparation).  
By means of the analysis of this simple discussion on the neck of a soft toy giraffe, it was 
shown that the reasoning underlying the children’s arguments is more sophisticated than it may 
appear at first sight. Indeed, Andrew does not perceive the soft toy animal as a giraffe, because, 
for him, it does not have the property of a giraffe, even though many other characteristics of it, 
such as the shape of the body in general and the color may coincide with that of a giraffe.  
 
4.2. Example 2: the sweets 
 
The second situation I chose to analyze is taken from the same discussion between Andrew 
(5:7 years), Ben (5:10 years) and the adult experimenter. However, it differs from the first in that 
it occurs in a rather ‘mute’ moment, where the children seem to explore what the next task is about. 
This time the adult experimenter gives the issue by means of her action: the task on the 
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conservation of liquids has been finished and the adult experimenter is preparing the next task, 
which is on the conservation of numbers. To this purpose, she prepares sweets of different shapes. 
Ben initiates a discussion, asking what the sweets are, as he seems not to know or to recognize 
them. As an answer, he gets among others the statement of Andrew that these ‘things’ are mints 
and that he has already eaten some of them. Continuing on the question whether the mints are 
eatable, Ben states his unwillingness to eat them. This is where the adult experimenter drops into 
the discussion stating turn 1 (see below) and thereby introducing implicitly the issue “Can we eat 
the sweets?”. What follows in excerpt 2 is the rest of the discussion on this issue, mainly taking 
place between Ben and the adult experimenter. At this moment the overall discussion has been 
going on for more than 12 minutes.  
 
Table 3. Excerpt 2: Participants: Andrew (5:7 years), Ben (5:10 years), adult experimenter 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 Exp. […] ((shakes her head)) no one has to eat anything (1.0) actually ((uses a pen 
to bring a mint out of the box)) if they xxx to  
2 Ben if they i if Andrew wants [to eat them 
3 Exp.       [this one is stuck 
4 Ben this one is stuck 
5 Exp. stuck (3.0) 
6 Ben maybe we can eat them= 
7 Andrew three= 
8 Ben you can't eat them because they're for adults 
 
In this short excerpt, Ben and the adult experimenter talk about two different subjects that 
overlap each other. I will focus on the above specified issue “Can we eat the sweets?”. The first 
standpoint on this issue is put forward by the adult experimenter in turn 1. Ben then bases his 
reasoning on this standpoint and concludes with his standpoint “you can’t eat them” that he 
supports with the argument “because they’re for adults” in turn 8. This discussion can be 
visualized by means of the analytic overview as follows: 
 
Table 4. Analytic overview of excerpt 2 
Issue (introduced by adult experimenter): Can we eat the sweets? 
    
Standpoint 1 Standpoint 2 
Ben 1 You can’t eat them Unspecified antagonist 2 (we can eat them) 
    
Argument Argument 
Adult experimenter 
T. 1 
1.1 no one has to eat 
anything 
 --- 
Ben 
T. 8 
1.2 they’re for adults   
 
The difference of opinion analyzed here has no specified antagonist. Both Ben and the adult 
experimenter are supporting the standpoint that the sweets do not have to be eaten. By taking the 
whole discussion into account, however, we can find a possible trigger of Ben’s reasoning by 
Andrew’s statement that declares mints to be something eatable. As is shown by the following 
AMT representation, Ben does not include Andrew’s statement that he has already eaten some 
mints in his reasoning.  
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By visualizing the relation between Ben’s argument and his standpoint “Andrew and I 
cannot eat the sweets,” one can see that, based on the argument put forward by the adult 
experimenter, Ben creates an endoxon that is particular to the situation. Indeed, by departing 
from the fact that adults can eat sweets, he implicitly refuses the adult experimenter’s argument 
“no one has to eat anything.” One may hypothecate that Ben’s reasoning may turn around the 
fact, that sweets are produced for a certain reason, that is for being eaten and therefore the adult 
experimenter’s argument in turn 1 cannot be sound and hence must be refuted. Although the 
endoxon Ben uses in order to make sense of the conversation and the actions taking place may 
convince an adult reader only to a limited extent, it can still be regarded as being part of a valid 
reasoning. Children may have different ontologies than adults, which is reflected in the present 
case in the reconstructed endoxon. 
Ben’s standpoint can be seen as of a subtype of the locus from definition, namely as a 
‘definition from species to individual.’ In his standpoint, Ben’s reasoning includes two of the 
three levels of Aristotle’s classification: species and individual. He classifies Andrew and 
himself – two individuals – as not being part of the species that can eat sweets. As mentioned 
in section 2, Aristotle claims a dependency in the hierarchy of things. Species being more 
extended than the individual, one can say that, if something is true for a species, it is true as 
well for all the individuals belonging to that species (Wagner & Rapp 2004, Rigotti & Greco 
in preparation). Thus taking Ben’s reasoning: If the predicate “can eat sweets” holds for the 
species ‘adults,’ it holds for every single adult. In this case, however, Ben makes use of a 
negative version of this reasoning. He associates the predicate “can eat sweets” to the species 
‘adults,’ and excludes Andrew and himself from it in order to arrive at the conclusion that he 
and Andrew cannot eat the sweets.  
By analyzing the implicit in Ben’s reasoning about the edibility of sweets, it was 
possible to make Ben’s thoughts more understandable and retraceable. Whereas a simple 
reading of Ben’s argument on his standpoint that the sweets cannot be eaten by Andrew and 
him does not seem ‘correct,’ the understanding of the underlying implicit reasoning, makes his 
position more clear. Even though Ben’s reasoning may nevertheless be regarded as ‘fallacious’ 
or non-completely ‘correct,’ an adult interlocutor acting according to the principle of charity 
(Anderson et al. 1997) is more likely prone to accept Ben’s argument, once he is aware of his 
reasoning.  
 
Endoxon: Adults are the ‘species’ for 
which the predicate “can eat sweets” 
holds 
Datum: Andrew and I are children 
(=not adults) 
First conclusion – Minor premise 1: Andrew and I are not part of 
the species for which the predicate “can eat sweets” holds 
Final conclusion: Andrew and I cannot eat sweets 
Maxim: If an individual is not part 
of a species, the predicates relative 
to that species do not apply to them. 
Locus from definition 
(from species to 
individual) 
Figure 2: AMT representation of Argument 1.2 of Situation 2. 
REBECCA G. SCHÄR 
12 
5. Conclusion and openings for future research  
 
In this paper, I have analyzed a case where small children under the age of six years in a semi-
structured setting spontaneously engaged in discussions. I have shown that the children are able 
to express their standpoints on an issue and support them with arguments in two different types 
of situations: In the discussion on the giraffe, the children spontaneously raised an issue that 
was not thought to need discussion by the adult experimenter. In the situation of the sweets, 
the children discussed on a sub-issue that was given by an adult, whereas the main issue was 
raised by the children. I have reconstructed the general framework of the discussion in a slightly 
modified version of the pragma-dialectical analytic overview, in order to visualize which 
arguments support a certain standpoint and which discussant(s) assume(s) the role of the 
antagonist or protagonist. – Something that is not always evident in children’s discussions. By 
using the AMT model for the reconstruction of the implicit premises, I was able to show that 
there is a sophisticated reasoning underlying small children’s arguments. The reconstruction of 
the implicit premises is furthermore a helpful means in order to show that the children’s 
reasoning is sometimes based on an ontology that differs from the adult’s, a fact that could 
make the children’s reasoning appear fallacious in the eyes of an adult.  
I have furthermore chosen to focus on the locus from definition, a locus that emerged 
in several cases during the first phase of an exploratory research on small children’s 
spontaneous argumentation conducted from July to November 2015. In this paper, I could 
identify the use of two different sub-loci of the locus from definition. The children’s use of 
them shows the sophistication of their reasoning. 
The present paper was an attempt to show the argumentative skills of small children, it 
therefore can be understood as a starting point for further research in many regards: First of all, 
it will be necessary, to amplify the research on the implicit in children’s argumentation, 
including less structured settings and smaller children. In addition to that, it needs to be 
investigated, whether a pattern of frequency can be found in what regards the choice of the 
locus by the children and what possible reasons for such a pattern may be. Furthermore, it also 
needs to be explored whether the use of certain loci is favored by certain settings.  
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Appendix 
 
sign description 
 raising intonation 
((  ))  nonverbal component 
(1.0)  pause of 1 second 
xxx  non understandable utterance 
[ overlapping segments 
=  immediately following turn 
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